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Abstract such as containment breaches, the environment
can impede repair, and extracting damaged
robots is often dangerous. Dynamic fault
Robots in hazardous environments must meet. detection systems that monitor in real time,
stringent requirements of both durability and such as the analytical redundancy (AR) method
reliability to be safe, as robust systems and described here, can contribute significantly to
efficient reliability techniques are critical to system reliability and safety, reducing these
safe operation in these environments. Rosie, a dangers. This allows completion of previously
large hydraulic robot designed for nuclear impossible tasks and often involves job creation
reactor decontamination and dismantlement, is rather than destruction. For these reasons, the
a prime example of such a robot. The study University-based part of our team has
discussed here uses a hydraulic testbed which investigated reliability issues for robots
closely models Rosie's wheel actuators to gather. extensively (refs. 5-7). (The group consists of a
data for development and testing of effective collaboration of the Rice and Clemson based
data analysis procedures aimed at reducing the university groups with Foster-Miller
dangers associated with dynamic failures this Technologies Incorporated, an organization
worksystem and others like it. with considerable experience in evaluating the
reliability of hydraulic systems.)
This paper focuses on practical use and
theoretical elaboration of the analytical The Rosie mobile worksystem (refs. 8, 9) is an
redundancy t~chnique which is used to important and interesting example robot that is
efficiently detect faults that have been on the cutting edge of hazardous environment
determined to be mission-hazardous by robotics, which has served as our inspiration
previous FMECA and fault tree analyses of the and motivation for this work. Rosie, under
Rosie system. We believe we have contributed development by RedZone Robotics Inc. and
significant improvements to the potential Carn~gie Mellon University's Field Robotics
overall reliability of the system. Additionally, Center, is a heavy-duty hydraulic robot
we have expanded the applicability of the AR designed for nuclear reactor decontamination
method to nonlinear systems in the course of and dismantlement. The robot has four
our work, making this valuable fault detection independently steerable wheels powered by
method more broadly applicable. hydraulic motors supporting a chassis sporting a
heavy-duty crane/manipulator. Fault detection
for Rosie is interesting and important, and we
Introduction are additionally using Rosie as a intermediate
step to begin looking at fault detection for
hydraulic systems in general.
One of the most important and fastest growing
areas in the robotics industry is the Our work focused on a method known as
development of robots capable of working in analytical redundancy (refs. 7, 10), or AR. AR
hazardous environments (refs. 1-4). Providing is a model-based state-space technique that
a high level of functionality in these arenas is derives the maximum number of independent
important simply because humans cannot safely tests of the consistency of sensor data with the
or cheaply work there. Additionally, system linearized system model and past control inputs.
failures can cause serious collateral damage AR yields tests to determine whether the system
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is performing normally, or is deviating from the discrete time variable, Lit is the time step
nominal model and presumably under fault - T g is the torque generated by the motor
conditions. We have used this technique - TI is the load torque
successfully on electrical robotic systems in the - VI and V2 are linear AR tests, NV3 and NV4
past (ref. 4), and is now applying it to the are nonlinear tests
hydraulic Rosie-like systems. - Vt is the volume of fluid within the motor
- uvand u(k) are the servovalve position
In a previous paper (ref. 7), we discussed the - ,!(k) is the state vector
derivation through AR of a suite of model based - fJe is the bulk modulus of the hydraulic fluid
tests for the default sensor package for - 8m and fXk) are the position of the motor
hydraulic wheel actuators, and introduced a shaft
system for using AR efficiently in nonlinear - p is the hydraulic fluid density
systems. Some of these tests are comparison of
the actual system response to control inputs to
the predicted response indicated by the model. The Testbed: The hydraulic wheel actuator
The other tests uncovered by the AR analysis subsystem has been determined to be a vital
reflect higher order state interdependencies, as component of the mobile platform through
discussed later and in (ref. 7). FMECA and fault tree based reliability analysis.
A failure of a wheel mechanism may prevent the
removal of the chassis from the reactor work site,
Rosie and the Hvdraulic Testbed which may be hazardous to potential repairmen.
The goal of the project was to develop effective
data analysis procedures for hydraulic wheel
Notation: The following variable names are used actuators and implement them on a testbed
in this paper. system under construction at Foster-Miller. The
- A, B, and C are the canonical discrete time results of this project can then be used to
state space system matrices enhance the reliability of existing and future
- Bm is the viscous damping coefficient robots.
- Ctm = cem+Cim represent total, external, and
internal leakage, respectively The system we are considering consists of a
- dm is the volumetric displacement of the rotary hydraulic motor connected to a 3000 PSI
motor hydraulic power supply through a hydraulic
- Jt is the inertia of the motor and load spool valve, as seen in figure 1. This system has
- Kf, kq and kc are valve flow coefficients considerable advantages as an actuator in a
- M = kc+Ctm is a generalized pressure nuclear environment. Hydraulic systems are
coefficient rugged and powerful, and much less likely to
- PI and p(k) are the continuous and discrete produce dangerous sparks than an electrical
pressure drops across the motor system. However, hydraulic systems are
- Ps is the hydraulic power supply nominal vulnerable to many faults that electrical systems
pressure of 3000 PSI do not experience, and are much harder to model
- Q is the net fluid flow into the spool valve due to their inherently nonlinear nature.
- t is the continuous time variable, k the
Spool Valve Motor
P(supply)4 8(k) Loss of
Speed
Feedback
Sticking ~ P(k)
Servovalve
L__~~ ,
Open Control Winding
Figure 1. Hydraulic System Testbed
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Bm61-J, . .
The dynamic equations for modeling this system VI =--- ~fJ(k) + fJ(k + I)
are equations (1) and (2) (ref. 11): ' d
+~p(k)=O, (4)
J,
T g = Pldm = JtBm + BmBm +r" (1) V2=( -1 +~+.:~+ 4/il;611 ) O(k)J, J; J,v,
Q =u K f 1.1.(- - - \p p,) =d B (dmBm611 -2dm61 4PodmM611 ) (k)v VP\l's- 1'" m m +++ p
V . (2) J,1 J, J,v,
+ (c. +c )p + ~ ( -4/il k 611)1m em I 4[3e +O(k+2)+ m q u(k)=O, (5)
J,v,
Analytical Redundancy: The analytical NV3=~iJ(k)+4P.C'm61-v, p(k)
redundancy (AR) method allows us to explicitly v, v,
derive the maximum possible number of linearly - 4p k 61
independent consistency tests for a system (refs. + p(k +1)+-~u(k)(:J(i.-=-p(k))= 0, (6)
4,10). Using a state-space control model of the v,vPs
system of interest, AR exploits the null space of
the observabilit~ matrix to allow the creation of a NV 4 =( 4Podm61) {iJ(k + I) - O(k) )+ (k + 2)
set of test equations. These tests use sensor data v ~ p
histories and known past control inputs to detect '
any deviation whatsoever from the static or + ( -2+4PoC,m61 )p(k+I)+ ( 1-4PoC,m61 )p(k)
dynamic behaviors of the model. The deviations v, v,
can then be analyzed for signs that indicate ( -4 k 61 )specific faults within the system. + Po q (u(k +1)-u(k))J(p. - p(k»)
v,£
The core of AR is the equation (3) (ref. 10), ( 4 k 61)which is used to determine the systems' + -~--!.- u(k) (p(k + 1) - p(k)) = O. (7)
observability null space: v,£ .J(P. - p(k))
[ ] [ Observability] The AR tests used can be interpreted as follows:
.Q . ~(k) = 0 . (3)
Matrix VI: A discretized version of the linear
differential equation describing the physical
dynamics of the motor and load and their relation
The null space of .Q represents the space the to the pressure load across the motor. This test
system state vector should operate in if checks to make sure that the motor is working as
functioning correctly. Since most systems will expected.
be somewhat noisy and possibly inaccurately
modeled, it is likely that the state vector will The faults investigated tended to cause large
project slightly out of the .Q space. Our research spikes in the output from this test. Since none of
has allowed us to reduce these errors by these faults caused large permanent changes in
explicitly modeling the nonlinearity of the the characteristics of the motor, this is not
system, as discussed in previous paper (refs. 7, surprising. The onset of the fault disturbs the
12). entire system, momentarily causing a large fault
signal. Once the disturbance settles, the
Using the equations (1) and (2) to model our undamaged motor resumes behaving as
testbed and our new nonlinear AR techniques expected.
from (ref. 12), we can derive the modified AR
tests given in equations (4) through (7): V2: This test is in some sense the discrete time
derivative of equation VI. However, it is also a
blending of the hydraulic equation with the
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kinematic equation, so its behavior is not
immediately predictable as derivative-like. A note about the y-axis of AR tests:
Further analysis tells us that this equation can
react to faults in ways that VI cannot. The y-axes of AR tests are arbitrary, as the test
derivation algorithm is insensitive to
V2 results are harder to examine than VI's since, multiplication through by a constant. The shape
as can be seen in the data section, V2's output of the curve is important, its magnitude is not, as
does not center on zero. It gives a steady-state long as the scaling factor is constant between
value representing unmodeled system and load different runs of the same test. We were careful
effects. Thus the test responds to changes in to insure that this restriction was followed for
system parameters by outputting a step function our tests. Thus, we should ignore units and
as these values change. magnitudes on the AR data plots presented
below, concentrating instead exclusively on
As a consequence of this, V2 is not a good test curve shape.
for certain faults when the system parameters
have changed for other reasons. For example,
minor changes in system parameters caused by
the work needed to install a simulated fault can Results
and do change the steady-state value of this test.
In the data analysis, this results in a difference In this section we examine example plots for a
bias between the V2 test result for the faulty run typical data run for various faults, and discuss
and the one for a fault free rig-configuration run the effectiveness of AR as a fault detection tool
with the nominal system parameters, even if the for each. The run with the fault installed is solid
fault itself is not responsible for the bias change. black, a fault free rig configuration run for
This effect is misleading, but not at all comparison is gray and dotted. Dashed circles
problematic if understood. Small variations in highlight areas of interest.
the steady-state values of this test may be safely
ignor~, and the test is s.till ~seful for fault Figure 2 displays the results of the first fault of
detect10n, as sudden steps m this test represent interest, which results from an open winding in
the ?ccurrence of a fault. Such steps are not the control servo valve. The onset and duration
amb1guous. of this fault is clear in all AR tests. The open
NV' Th' . ." winding acts like a step input that is not
3. 1S test 1S a d1scretized verS10n of the accounted for in the model provoking a strongequations. . representing the hydraulic AR response. '
charactenstics of the servovalve and motor.
NV3 examines the pressure and shaft position ..signals and determines if these are consistent T?e ~ext fault data, shown m figure 3, 1S from a
with its model of the hydraulic system. sticking wheel motor control valve. As a ramp
input is run through the controller, the valve
NV3 responds to faults with a step function, pe?odically sticks in its current position. This is
much like test V2. This makes it vulnerable to ev1dent on all AR tests, although VI and NV4
all the problems with varying system parameters ~how clearest results. Included for comparison
that V2 has. (See above.) It is thus important to 1S raw data from the sens~r that showed the
remember that a small steady-state difference clearest unprocessed re~ction to. the fault.
between the faulty and rig configuration versions Clearl~, AR gr~atly ampl1fied and 1solated the
of this test is not necessarily significant. fault s1gnal. Durmg the parts of the run where the
system is stuck, it does not follow the dynamic
NV4: NV4 is the "derivative" of NV3 in the model at all, and is thus easy to detect.
same manner that V2 is the derivative of VI. It
also blends the kinematic equation into the Figure 4 shows data from a loss of speed
hydraulic one in a similar way to how V2 blends feedback in the servovalve fault. As the failed
the hydraulic equation into the kinematic. In this sensor invalidates the control loop, AR detects
case, the original equation exhibits the step this as a deviation from the model-expected
function behavior, while the derivative, NV4, behavior. Note that AR does have some problem
responds to faults with spikes similar to test VI. detecting this fault in an a idling system (not
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Figure 2. Open Winding Fault
shown). As the idling system is already giving a careful investigation of faults induced in the
near-:zero value for the zeroed out sensor, there is Foster-Miller test rig has been very valuable,
no deviation from the model, so the fault is both in demonstrating that the AR theory
undetectable by any model-based method until "works" on real hardware, and in identifying
the expected output from the sensor deviates areas in which alternative sensing strategies
from the faulty stuck value. Despite this and/or fault detection techniques may be needed.
limitation, AR would alert the user as soon as a The results clearly show that our AR framework
motion was attempted. is a useful and effective method of fault
detection for hydraulic robot systems.
As seen above.. the nonlinear AR-based methods
proved very effective in detecting a significant However, as AR is model based, and thus must
number of real faults introduced into the deal with certain limits inherent in model based
hardware. We believe that development and detection. A good example from our tests would
V1
RCO303 4 8
--
Faulty Run 2 6 - (BFOII03) 4
,'rW. 2
Flow Through Motor
- - (Best Unurocessed Test)
0 10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 1
NV3 NV4 ;' "
I
--~.. , \
I N~I
\ I( I
ISpeed: Load: - , 5 RPM 1500
- 1 2 3
-10 10 20 30 40 - 20 30 40
Figure 3. Sticking Servovalve Fault
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Figure 4. Loss of Speed Feedback Fault
be small leak faults. Leaks of a magnitude of 5% such systems in the workplace by minimizing
of .the total flow is barely detectable by this damage done by and to faulty systems as well as
system, and leaks of 1 % or smaller are not the amount of time wasted by false alarms.
detectable at all, as the variation from the model
parameters is smaller than system noise. Even Previous theory for rigorous model-based fault
small leaks in high-pressure hydraulic systems detection methods such as AR have been limited
are very serious faults. and detecting them is a to linear systems, which is not appropriate for
priority. Thus AR is best used with hydraulically driven robots. The nonlinear AR
complementary error detection schemes (such as methods as developed here are of considerable
spectral analysis) designed to detect faults that theoretical interest while being directly
do not seriously affect parameters of the applicable to the fault-detection for any
hydraulic dynamics, if such faults are likely to be significantly nonlinear system. The Rice and
a problem. Clemson group is engaged in ongoing work to
further develop theoretically robust nonlinear AR
techniques.
Conclusions and Future Work
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